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1. Introduction and summary 
 
Media reports and claims by participants in the private equity business consistently claim that companies 
which have been bought out by private equity create jobs, and generate faster growth in employment than 
other companies.  This report examines the surveys on which they are based, especially the methods used for 
selecting the companies, collecting data and calculating the contribution of private equity funds, and 
discusses the validity and interpretation of these results. It then discusses the main issues concerning data on 
this subject, and offers conclusions on future useful research. 
 
The main findings can be summarised as follows: 
 The major surveys conducted for the UK, EU, and USA private equity associations suffer from a 
number of flaws, both in sampling and in data quality, rendering their estimates of employment 
impact effectively worthless. Recent surveys in the UK by academics and journalists avoid many of 
these problems. 
 Most of the assertions made by commentators, and some made by the reports themselves, cannot be 
justified on the basis of the evidence from existing surveys. The most reliable results suggest that 
buyouts generally depress wages but there is no clear overall effect on employment compared with 
other forms of ownership.  
 Problems of self-selection and the difficulty of verifying data on employment arise from the 
information opacity which is a systematic feature of private equity buyouts.  
 There is a need for (a) detailed research on the actual impact on employment, pay and industrial 
relations in each buyout in recent years (b) much greater information rights for employees and 
investors both before and after buyouts 
 
2. Issues 
2.1. Overview 
Most of the discussion concerning the impact on employment of private equity (PE) buyouts is ultimately 
based on reference to a small number of surveys and reports. The next section examines five of the most 
relevant and influential reports: three published by private equity associations for the UK, Europe and the 
USA (BVCA/IE 2006; EVCA/CEFS 2005; NVCA/Global Insights 2007), one by the Financial Times (FT 
2007), and one by academics at Nottingham (Amess and Wright 2007).   
 
Other recent reports, such as those published by A.T.Kearney and The Work Foundation, rely principally on 
these surveys for their information (AT Kearney 2007; Thornton 2007).  The Kearney report also references 
other reports by national associations of private equity groups, which may have similar flaws to those 
discussed below. 
 
There are a number of methodological problems with all the surveys published by the PE associations of the 
UK, USA and Europe.  None of these surveys can support the highly general claims that PE groups increase 
employment in companies in which they invest. The FT survey suffers less from these flaws, and the Amess 
and Wright survey addresses most of the methodological problems. 
 
The soundest research, by Amess and Wright,  is compatible with the hypothesis that the net contribution of 
private equity groups (as distinct from internal managers) is to deliver reductions in wages, and to deliver 
employment levels lower than the companies‟ potential, and that these are the mechanisms of an 
“opportunistic transfer of wealth from employees to new owners”.  
 
On wages, their evidence strongly suggests that PE buyouts have an overall effect of depressing wages.  The 
evidence on employment is mixed. Evidence of growth in employment needs to be interpreted by 
comparison with comparable companies, in terms of sector and growth prospects. 
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2.2. Sampling issues 
The issue that is currently most discussed is the effect of PE buyouts of companies which are stock exchange 
quoted (public companies). This is a different category of company from PE venture capital investment in 
small start-up companies. It is well known, and not contentious, that start-up  companies which survive will 
show significant growth. A number of surveys however include data on both buyouts and venture capital 
investments, but then use the data to draw conclusions about buyouts. Such data may however reflect the 
positive impact of venture capital, and within the total, the impact of buyouts may be negative. 
 
Voluntary surveys of firms can provide some useful data but cannot be regarded as representative where the 
respondents select themselves in ways which bias the results. Data collected from those who can choose 
whether or not to respond, or data collected from buyouts which have survived, risks giving an 
unrepresentative picture.1  
 
The numbers employed by PE companies has certainly risen over the last few years. But this is because the 
number and size of companies owned by PE funds has grown sharply in recent years in the UK, Europe and 
the USA – it does not necessarily reflect any growth at all in the individual companies. Of itself, this data 
tells us about the growth of PE funds (which is well known and not disputed) but nothing about whether 
employment in the companies themselves is higher or lower than it would have been without the change of 
ownership. 
2.3. Data issues 
Most surveys rely on data provided by respondents in the PE-owned companies themselves, which is not 
checked or verified, or use respondents‟ own judgments and opinions as raw data. This kind of data is less 
robust than verifiable public data. 
 
Employment data is presented in some surveys as though it was derived by totalling information about 
individual companies, but this is not always the case. In the absence of good public data, some of the surveys 
use estimates based on general information about companies in a sector, rather than information about a 
sample of actual companies.  
2.4. Interpretation issues 
Any study of the effects of a specific phenomenon, such as PE needs to establish what difference that factor 
makes. Data on the employment changes in PE companies therefore needs to be compared with data on other 
similar companies which have not changed ownership. Such comparisons are sometimes made with trends in 
the whole economy, but should be made between PE and non-PE companies in the same sector – otherwise 
the comparison may simply reflect the fact that PE companies are in faster-growing sectors, for example. 
 
There is a related issue which concerns interpretation of results. Within each sector, companies which are the 
subject of buyouts by PE funds are selected according to whether they can deliver sufficient growth to be 
worth more in 6 years time. This selected set of companies should therefore, in every sector, be generating 
faster growth in output and employment than others, before the PE fund bought them: if they are not, then 
the PE funds‟ own performance as selectors of growth companies would be worse than random.  The 
companies, if well selected, may have continued to exhibit faster than average growth if they had not been 
the subject of buyouts.  
3. Surveys 
Five surveys are examined in this section: the three principal surveys covering the UK, USA and EU (each 
commissioned by the relevant association representing private equity and venture capital); and two other 
surveys concerning the UK, one by Financial Times journalists, and one study by academics at Nottingham 
University.  
                                                     
1  The Global Insights 2007 survey shows the scale of failures for venture capital: out of 11,686  firms backed by 
venture capital between 1991 and 2000, 14% have been floated as stock exchange companies, 33% have been sold to 
other private investors or companies, 18% are known to have failed, and another 35% are still private or „unknown‟ – 
but Global Insights says that “of these [the 35%] most have quietly failed”. So almost half of the firms backed by 
venture capital have failed completely. (Global Insights p.11) 
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3.1. NVCA/Global Insight surveys (USA) 
The USA venture capital association, the NVCA, publishes an annual report compiled by Global Insights. 
The latest version of this report was published in February 2007 (NVCA/Global Insights 2007); a previous 
report under the same title was published in 2004.  
 
The report suffers from the inclusion of venture capital, unclear coverage, partial lack of sectoral 
comparisons, and data weaknesses including selective data, lack of data, and data estimates. 2 
 
The survey nowhere defines which sets of companies are covered by the survey figures. This makes 
interpretation of the figures very difficult. 
 
Firstly, it appears that the survey includes venture capital start-ups as well as buyouts. Global Insights (GI) 
consistently use the phrase „venture capital backed companies‟. This means that the results cannot be used to 
draw conclusions about buyouts alone.  
 
Secondly, it appears that the survey actually covers some large stock exchange quoted companies: the main 
section on employment says that: “Venture capital backed companies known for their innovative technology 
and business models, such as Microsoft, Intel, Genentech, and Starbucks, added more than 1.3 million jobs 
to the U.S. economy between 2000 and 2005, resulting in annual growth of approximately 2.9 percent.” 
(page13)  This implies that the set of companies covered includes all companies who had ever, at any stage, 
had private equity investors, in which case the employment and sales of companies are still included even 
years after they have been launched on the stock exchange. But it is implausible to claim that the growth of 
publicly listed companies should be attributable to PE investment at an earlier stage.   
 
Thirdly, GI make some unexplained revisions to their previously reported data for earlier years. The 2007 
report has different, lower, data on employment levels in 2000 and 2003 from the 2004 report (see table 1). 
The revisions are crucial to GI‟s claims about employment growth. GI estimates that the level of 
employment in PE firms in 2005 was 10.0million, but the previous report had said that employment in 2003 
was 10.1 million – in which case GI would have had to report a fall in employment in PE-backed companies, 
compared with growth of 1.3% in the national economy.  But GI avoid this by revising the figure for 2003 
downwards, to 9.2 million, and so claims that employment in these companies has risen.  
Table 1.  Changes in employment data between NVCA/Global Insight surveys of 2004 and 2007 
(millions of employees) 
 GI survey 
2004 
GI survey 
2007 
2000 9.5 8.7 
2003 10.1 9.2 
2005  10.0 
 
Finally, GI‟s figures are flawed by miscalculations. On their own data, they miscalculate the CAGR for 
2003-2005 as 4.1%, when the correct figure is 4.3%; and the CAGR for 2000-2005 is miscalculated as 2.9%, 
instead of the correct figure of 2.8% 
 
GI also revises in the 2003 data in the tables of employment in the largest states, with odd results. For 
example, GI are now telling Californians that PE supports 2.285 million jobs in their state in 2005, about 
10% less than the figure of 2.471 million jobs in 2003 which the previous report had claimed. But that figure 
for 2003 has now been revised downwards to 2.173million, so GI claims the figure for 2005 represents a 2.5 
percent annual growth rate in employment.” (Page 20). 
 
                                                     
2  The Economic Importance of Venture Capital Backed Companies to the U.S. Economy Third Edition   NVCA/Global 
Insight 2007: page 23.  http://www.nvca.org/pdf/NVCA_VentureCapital07.pdf  
“The second database consisted of 181 venture capital backed companies that offered IPOs during the January 1, 2003 
to June 20, 2006 period. Sales and employment figures for all 181 companies were obtained and added to the database. 
The third database was comprised of 306 companies that received venture capital backed investment funds over the 
March 1, 2003 to June 30, 2003 period. Employment and sales data for 2005 were obtained for 143 of the 306 firms” 
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The data is presented in the report as though it was based on actual data for all the companies covered. 
However, much of the data is estimated by the authors; data is missing for many companies – especially the 
recently PE-backed companies; and the data that was collected consists of non-verifiable reports from the 
companies.  
 
Of the 306 companies that received venture capital backing between 2003 and 2005, employment and sales 
data was only obtained for 143 – so data is missing for more than half the target population, and these non-
respondents may be more likely to be poor performers.  
 
By contrast, data was used for all 181 companies which offered IPOs during the period – a group which, by 
definition, represents a successfully exited buyout. The contrast between data availability for these IPOs, as 
compared with the recent investment targets, highlights the problem for researchers of the private data 
opacity created by PE buyouts,  
 
For the great majority of other companies in their database GI used no company data at all, but simply 
assumed that they grew at the average industry rate “2005 employment and revenue figures were projected 
using industry growth rates.‟ 3 No comparative conclusions can be drawn from such a circular assumption.  
GI only attempted to get specific data on the largest 200 companies in 2003, but even for this group GI used 
actual data for 2003 and then for 2005 „employment and revenue estimates were entered into the database as 
available‟. So the 2005 data on this group of largest companies was partly estimated and partly missing, in 
both cases to an unknown extent.  
 
The 2004 report claimed that „venture-capital backed company wages grow faster than national average‟, on 
the basis of figures showing that VC-backed companies experienced 12% growth in wages from 200-2003, 
compared with 11% for non-VC companies. As the report itself notes, “venture capital firms tend to cluster 
in fast growing and higher paying industries”, and so such figures may therefore simply reflect the sectoral 
distribution – it leaves open whether the impact of PE on wages is positive, neutral or negative.  There is no 
discussion of wage data in the 2007 survey.   
3.2. EVCA/CEFS study (EU) 
The European Private Equity and Venture capital Association (EVCA) published a report on the 
“Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe” in December 2005 
(EVCA/CEFS 2005).4 The survey suffers from various methodological and data limitations (some of which 
are noted in the report itself). 5  
 
The overall figures, which are most commonly quoted, include venture capital companies; the figures on 
employment levels are only estimates based on assumptions, not observations; the figures of employment 
growth are based on unverifiable data from a small and self-selected sample of companies; and the full 
results of the comparisons with non-PE companies are not published.  
 
The CEFS study is based on a survey of 99 buyout companies and 102 venture capital financed companies, 
and finds that 6m people are employed in PE-financed companies (of which 5m. in buyouts), 3% of total 
employment in Europe. It claims that 1million new jobs were created by European PE companies between 
2000 and 2004: 420,000 (net of post-purchase reductions) were in buyouts, and 630,000 in venture-backed 
companies. PE-financed buyout companies experienced employment growth of 2.4% per annum, compared 
with only 0.7% across Europe as a whole in the same period, and an average annual decline of 0.2% in 
employment in the largest 600 private companies. 6   They also found that in management buyouts, 
employment grew by 3.1% per year, but where new management was brought in (which happened in only a 
                                                     
3 This may be a very large number of companies, since GI describe their database as consisting of  „23,476 venture 
capital backed companies‟; excluding the 200 largest in 2003, the 181 IPOs, and the 306 newly backed companies since 
2003, leaves 22,791 companies on which the data consists of assumed parity with sectoral performance (97.1% of GI‟s 
entire database). 
4 Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe. EVCA. December 2005.       
http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_129_att_953.pdf  ). 
5 Appendix 1 pages 30-38.   
6   Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe. EVCA. December 2005.       
http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_129_att_953.pdf  
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small number of cases), employment fell by an average of 2.3% per year.  Venture start-up companies 
showed the fastest employment growth, not surprisingly.7   
 
The first limitation is that the data on employment levels are not based on the study of actual employment of 
even a sample set of companies. They are calculated  from (a) data on the distribution of buyout companies 
by bands of numbers employed (b) assumptions about the average size of companies within each band, and 
then (c) multiplying these estimates by the number of companies in which PE funds have invested. These 
employment estimates are then split between buyouts and venture start-ups, not on the basis of any data 
about actual companies, but by a simple rule of thumb assumption that companies with more than 200 
employees are buyouts and companies with less than 200 are start-ups.8  
 
The second limitation is that the data on employment growth came entirely from PE groups themselves. The 
PE groups decided which companies they wanted to include – worse performing companies may be less 
likely to be included, thus skewing the sample. The PE groups also decided whether to answer themselves, or 
ask the companies to answer – in either case, the data submitted by the groups was not publicly verifiable.  
 
The third weakness in the study lies in the comparisons between buyout companies and other companies in 
the same sector. This sectoral comparison is important because buyouts are likely to concentrate on growth 
sectors, and growth companies within these sectors, and so are likely to show a faster growth profile than the 
economy as a whole. There is a general weakness, because the set of non-PE companies chosen for 
comparison were the largest companies in each sector, and therefore not necessarily the fastest growing 
group in each sector. The results of this comparison are not fully presented in the report, but the text allows 
the derivation of the table below (table 2).  As the report itself acknowledges, the buyouts do not perform 
better than the largest listed companies in every sector: indeed, transportation and computing may be the 
only two out of ten sectors in which buyouts do better.  
Table 2.  Comparative employment effect by sector of PE Buyouts in EVCA/CEFS study 
(? = no figure given in report).   
Sector PE Buyout 
companies 
Largest EU 
companies in 
sector  
Difference (+ = 
buyouts better)  
Buyouts BETTER or 
WORSE than sector 
average  
 Employment 
growth % 
Employment 
growth % 
  
Transportation 17.3 0.6 +16.7 BETTER 
Computer-related 10.3 1.4 +8.9 BETTER 
Healthcare 6.7 ? ? ? 
Construction 5.0 ? ? ? 
Consumer-related 4.0 ? ? ? 
Manufacturing 2.7 ? ? ? 
Other services -2.3 0.6 -2.9 WORSE 
Chemicals and materials -3.0 -2.8 -0.2 WORSE 
Financial services -3.8 0.4 -4.2 WORSE 
Communications -6.3 1.3 -7.6 WORSE 
Source: author‟s calculations from text of EVCA study section 3.4    
 
3.3. BVCA/IE 2006 (UK) 
The BVCA publish an annual report on the economic impact of private equity, carried out by IE Consulting: 
the latest version was published in November 2006 (BVCA/IE 2006).  A full report is also available 
(IE/BVCA 2006). The employment claims of the report suffer from special problems,  and in other respects 
the report suffers from a similar set of flaws to other surveys, including the  inclusion of  venture capital, 
self-selecting samples, and reliance on private data.  
 
                                                     
7   Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe. EVCA. December 2005.       
http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_129_att_953.pdf  
8 See appendix 1 pages 30-33 
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The report claims that “companies that have received private equity funding account for the employment of 
around 2.8 million people in the UK, equivalent to 19% of UK private sector employees…over the five years 
to 2005/6, the number of people employed worldwide by UK private equity-backed companies increased by 
an average of 9% p.a.” (page 3).  All three of these figures are problematic, however. 
 
Firstly, the figure of  2.9m. does not measure actual jobs in PE companies at present, but employment in any 
company which has ever, at any time in its history, received private equity investment 
9
, and so it does not 
reflect actual employees of actual PE companies in 2006. The report confirms this by estimating that the 
actual numbers employed by PE companies in 2006 was only 1.2 million – “8% of UK private sector 
employees” (pages 5,7). The report claims credit for this - “This year we have also estimated the number of 
people employed by companies that are currently backed by private equity.” (p.5) – and this is the figure 
used in the BVCA evidence to the Treasury, which avoids all mention of the headline figures of 2.8 million 
and 19%.  
 
Secondly, it is difficult to reconcile their claims, about the proportion of private sector employees, with the 
actual government data on private sector employment. At the end of 2006, this stood at about 23.2 million – 
about four-fifths of  total UK employment, which stands at 29.0million. 10 Using these official figures, the 
BVCA estimate of 1.2 million current PE company employees represents only 5.2% of official private sector 
employment, and just 4.1% of total UK employment. The BVCA headline estimate of  2.8million should be 
12.1% of private sector employment, 9.6% of total UK employment. The percentages claimed by BVCA do 
not appear to be correct. The corrections are set out in table 3. 
Table 3.  Correcting BVCA calculations of percentages of UK private sector employment  
 „Headline‟ PE 
employees 
figure  (BVCA 
estimate 2006)  
Actual current PE 
company 
employees 
(BVCA estimate 
2006) 
Employees (millions) 2.8  1.2  
BVCA  claimed % of private sector  employees 19% 8% 
BVCA  figures as % of actual UK private sector employees (23.2m.) 12% 5% 
BVCA  figures as % of all UK employees (29.0m.) 10% 4% 
 
Sources:  (a) BVCA estimates from BVCA/IE 2006  (b) Figures on private and public sector employment:  
National Statistics  Press Release 14 March 2007 Public sector employment Quarter 4 2006 Table 5, page 17. 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/pse0307.pdf  
 
Thirdly, the claimed annual rate of increase does not fit easily with the BVCA figures for numbers employed 
in their reports for previous years. In 2005 BVCA gave exactly the same estimate of the level, 2.9m.; in 2004 
and 2003 the levels were slightly lower, at 2.7m.; so the average annual growth rate over the last three years 
has been only 2.4% per annum.  
 
Companies backed by venture capital accounted for 62% of the sample in the survey (p.8). The claim made 
at the start, that 92% of companies said “without private equity the business would not have existed at all or 
would have developed less rapidly” demonstrates the distorting effects of including venture capital 
companies, and of a self-selecting set of respondents.   
  
The sample and data suffer from two layers of self-selection. Firstly, the survey began with a set of 5,700 
existing companies, thus excluding all those companies which had failed to survive. Secondly, most did not 
take part in the survey: 1,457 agreed to respond, a response rate of about 26%.  
 
                                                     
9 “Companies included and defined in this report as „private equity backed companies‟ are companies that have, at some 
time, received private equity investment, regardless of whether a private equity investor still holds a stake in the 
company.” (BVCA/IE 2007, p.22) 
10 National Statistics  Press Release 14 March 2007 Public sector employment Quarter 4 2006 Table 5, page 17. 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/pse0307.pdf 
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Some of the data is surprising. For example, venture companies in the survey have increased their worldwide 
employment by 12% p.a., but over the same 5-year period their sales have increased by only 8% per annum – 
implying an annual decline in labour productivity. MBOs, the FTSE 100, and the FTSE Mid-250 companies, 
used for comparisons, all showed sales growth faster than employment growth: although the implied 
productivity improvement of MBOs was also worse than for either set of FTSE companies (see table 4). The 
survey makes no comment on this at all, in either the published or the full version. It is also surprising if 
venture companies have grown their sales only slightly faster than FTSE 100 companies, over the last 5 
years, which is also implied by the BVCA/IE results. These results suggest that the data or the sample should 
be reviewed for possible flaws. 
Table 4.  Venture capital companies: falling productivity implied by BVCA study 
 Annual growth in 
sales 
Annual growth 
in employment 
Implied annual  change 
in labour productivity  
Venture companies 8% 12% -3.6% 
MBOs 7% 10% +2.8% 
FTSE mid-250 companies 5% 2% +2.9% 
FTSE 100 companies 7% 1% +5.9% 
Source: BVCA/IE 2007, p. 5, 6, 9, 10 and author‟s calculations 
 
The full survey report, however, does discuss the problem of the implied comparison – the difficulty of 
knowing what would have happened without a PE buyout. The authors also note that it is questionable to 
assume that all employment growth in PE companies should be attributed to the PE investment; “The 
assumption is most vulnerable perhaps for management buyouts and buy-ins, where the alternative of trade 
sales (sales of subsidiaries to other companies) is often available and where, in any event, the economic 
activity might continue – though potentially at a slower rate of growth – if the buyout did not take place.” 
(IE/BVCA 2006 pp 6-7) 
 
3.4. FT survey April 2007 
The Financial Times published the results of a survey of the largest 30 buyouts in the UK in 2003 and 2004 – 
both the report and the data are made available by the FT 11 (FT 2007).  The report says that “More than 
36,700 extra jobs were added, a rise of more than 25 per cent… The FT's finding that private equity backed 
deals are more likely to increase employment than reduce it mirrors other recent studies”.  The figure of 
36,700 is a rounded net total arrived at by adding up the reported gains (totalling  49,198) and the reported 
losses (totalling 12,468).  
 
The great majority of the reported employment changes arise from mergers and acquisitions, not from 
organic growth; the survey has to rely on unverified data from companies, and some companies, including 
some with known job losses, excluded themselves from the survey.  
 
The report contains some discussion of the reasons for changes, as the overall picture “masks a wide variety 
of different outcomes and management decisions”.  One interesting feature is the importance of acquisitions 
and disposals. This factor was mentioned by a quarter of the companies, but in terms of size, it is much the 
greatest factor – the acquisitions of the nursing home group NHP and of gambling group Gala alone account 
for nearly 30,000 of the job gains, and 7,000 are from the overseas expansion of Fitness first, which may also 
represent mainly acquisitions; the disposals by Linpac account for nearly a third of the job losses.  Apart 
from these four cases, the net gain is 3,000 – which would represent growth of about 2%.  The report also 
noted the relevance of discussing what would have happened in the absence of private equity – in discussing 
the losses at Queens Moat House it notes that the company was near insolvent at the time of takeover and so 
may not have continued without cutbacks in any case – although, like others, the survey fails to make 
systematic comparisons with companies from the same sectors. 
 
                                                     
11   FT.com :  report at 
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=private+equity&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=070401004169&page=9 and data at  
http://www.ft.com/cms/57636bb0-e066-11db-8b48-000b5df10621.xls  
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Despite being small in number, the companies studied were chosen by the researchers on the basis of clear 
criteria – and so exclude venture capital start-ups. However, the survey still suffers from problems of self-
selection in relation to the data: 6 out of the 30 did not give any figures; and the employment data was 
supplied by the firms themselves, not from published sources. This affects the status of the headline net 
figure: the report notes that Queens Moat Houses admitted that they had made big reductions in employment, 
but declined to give figures: as a result the net „total‟ does not reflect this loss of jobs. Others who did not 
give figures may also be concealing job losses: for example, another company listed in the FT survey as not 
providing figures is Torex, now  merged with iSoft, which is experiencing considerable difficulties and last 
year “pleased investors” by announcing it would cut the jobs of 15% of its workforce.12    
 
Finally, it is not strictly accurate to say that “PE backed deals are more likely to increase employment”. Out 
of the 30 companies, 10 gave the FT figures showing an increase, 2 said there was no change, 12 gave the FT 
figures showing there had been reductions, and 6 gave no information.  It would be more correct to say that 
the buyouts were slightly more likely to reduce employment, but the increases were larger than the losses. 
3.5. Amess and Wright (2007) 
Amess and Wright‟s study is far more reliable than the industry sponsored reports, in a number of key 
respects. Firstly, its sample is not based on self-selected respondents to questionnaires, but on a dataset 
covering the full range of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the UK. Secondly, it excludes venture capital 
startups. Thirdly, it builds in comparisons with firms in the same sector which were not subject to LBOs. 
Fourthly, they use published audited data from company accounts filed at Companies House (which even 
privately owned companies are required to submit).   
 
The survey also distinguishes between LBOs involving existing managers, which are classified as  
management buyouts (MBOs), and takeovers by private funds without any existing management, which are 
classified as management buy-ins (MBIs).   
 
Two points should be noted about the sample which affect its interpretation in relation to the impact of PE 
funds.  
 
Firstly, the dataset includes management buyouts (MBOs) even where no private equity fund was involved.13 
This may have a significant effect on interpretation of the results, because Amess and Wright find that it is 
the subset of  MBOs which accounts for the positive contributions to employment levels: they do not report 
if this is still true for the subset of MBOs where PE funds are involved. It is thus possible that the results for 
MBOs, and for LBOs overall, overstate employment gains compared with the subset of MBOs including PE 
funds.  
 
Secondly, in the control set of companies not subject to LBOs, Amess and Wright excluded firms which 
showed growth in assets of more than 100% in any one year, in order to exclude the effects of mergers and 
takeovers.14 The rationale for this is not explained, but it means that the growth of the non-LBO sample is 
deflated by the exclusion of the effect of acquisitions, whereas growth by acquisitions made by the LBOs 
themselves appears to remain included. This second issue may lead to over-estimating employment growth 
in LBOs relative to other firms – acquisitions and disposals account for a large proportion of the employment 
effects observed in the data from the FT survey, for example (see above).  
 
The main results on employment and wages are shown in Table 5.  
 
Overall, the report finds that there is no significant effect of LBOs on employment, compared with other 
companies; but buyouts involving existing managers (MBOs) are associated with higher employment (after 
                                                     
12 ComputerWire August 28, 2006 iSoft Avoids Delisting After Publishing Results 
13 “MBIs are typically larger than MBOs because they are primarily instigated by the private equity firms. In contrast, 
MBOs might not have private equity support and are typically instigated by incumbent managers.” 
14 “firms whose total assets increased by at least 100% in a one year period were also precluded. Following Conyon et 
al. (2001b), we used this „rule of thumb‟ in an attempt to avoid mergers and acquisitions entering the control sample.” 
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the first year), whereas buyouts which are purely external (MBIs) are associated with significantly lower 
employment.15 
 
On wages, the analysis concludes that, overall, all LBOs are associated with significant cuts in wages, 
compared with firms which have not been the subject of LBOs. This relative cut in wages is greatest for 
MBIs, but is also significant for MBOs. Whereas employees of non-buyout companies get average increases 
of 0.93% per year, employees in MBOs only get an average rise of 0.62%, and employees of MBIs get on 
average a slight pay reduction per year of 0.04%.  
Table 5.  Changes in employment and wages in MBOs, MBIs, and non-buyout companies 
 Average annual change 
in employment (%) 
Average annual change 
in wages (%) 
Non-buyout companies 0.26 0.93 
MBOs 0.77 0.62 
MBIs -0.55 -0.04 
Source: Amess et al 2007B, Amess and Wright 2007, from text. 
 
They conclude that these findings are consistent with the theory “that corporate change will lead to 
management breaking implicit agreements and transferring wealth from employees to new owners.” This 
theory was developed in response to the similar wave of mergers and buyouts in the 1980s, when 
shareholders also made large gains from increased share prices16. The takeovers did not create wealth by 
improving productivity but simply enabled shareholders to extract more at the expense of other stakeholders, 
including employees: “hostile takeovers facilitate opportunistic behaviour at the expense of 
stakeholders…the available empirical evidence suggests that the redistributions associated with takeovers 
can be large.” (Shliefer and Summers 1988 p.34) 
 
They also conclude that the findings are consistent with the theory that MBOs enable internal managers to 
perform better without the constraints of the previous organisational structure, but these internal managers 
are also likely to be aware of maintaining trust relations with workers, and so protect employment “to elicit 
employee commitment to the recovery and success of the firm”; external financial specialists are less likely 
to recognise these benefits and so more likely to cut jobs.  
 
One feature of these findings is the general effect of LBOs in depressing wages, an aspect which has been 
given much less attention than the impact on employment.  The difference between MBOs and MBIs in 
employment effects suggests that the external contribution of PE firms may be the most problematic aspect 
of buyouts for employment effects. The contribution of internal managers (with or without PE involvement) 
is positive for growth which supports employment; without this contribution, the impact of LBOs on 
employment growth is negative (and is also negative on wages).  This negative impact may be greater than 
shown in the results, if the LBO data includes growth by acquisitions, some of which is excluded from the 
non-LBO firms (see above). 
 
PE firms do not choose companies for buyouts at random, so companies which are chosen for buyouts are 
likely to be those with most potential for growth. Amess and Wright for example found that LBO companies, 
before the buyout, had significantly lower productivity than other companies in the same sector.  
4. Conclusions 
The estimates of employment impact made by the BVCA, EVCA and NVCA are worthless. This paper 
shares the conclusions of a report prepared for the OECD on private equity, which concluded that: “Evidence 
on the effects of buy-outs on employment is mixed”, and did not consider the surveys sponsored by the 
private equity associations were even worth mentioning. (Wright et al. 2007A p.50).   
                                                     
15 “We find that all LBOs together do not have a significant effect on employment growth but they do have significantly 
lower wage growth than non-LBOs. Both MBOs and MBIs are found to have a negative impact on wage growth. The 
employment equation, however, indicates that MBOs have higher employment growth and MBIs have lower 
employment growth than cohorts in the same industry.” 
16 These gains by shareholders were also defended on the grounds that they must be based on increased efficiency: “this 
increased profitability must come from the company‟s improved productivity” (Jensen 1984).    
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This discussion has highlighted the problem of the lack of public audited data and self-selected samples of 
companies. This problem is created by the buyout process: in buyouts, PE firms are taking information about 
the firms out of the public domain, and the PE firms themselves gain a monopoly on information about these 
companies. This information monopoly creates asymmetries which are problematic not only for employees 
and unions but also for investors, policy makers and researchers.  
 
The information rights of employees and investors in PE companies should be strengthened by regulation, so 
that audited information at least equivalent to Companies House accounts is made available to unions or 
investors; this information should also be made publicly available on the internet, to facilitate independent 
research; reports from CEOs on company strategy should be made available to unions and investors at least 
annually.   Independent research should be encouraged into the actual experience of employment in all 
companies which have been the subject of PE buyouts. The BCVA and ECVA should be encouraged to 
review the methodologies used for their surveys. 
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